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CHARLES F. HINKLE*
Article I, Section 5:  A Remnant of
Prerevolutionary Oregon
Constitutional Law
Despite an occasional glimmer of independent state consti-tutional jurisprudence in Oregon before January 1977, it
was not until Hans Linde was appointed to the Oregon Supreme
Court in that month that the court began in earnest to develop a
body of state constitutional law independent of federal constitu-
tional interpretation.1  As a result of this “Oregon Constitutional
Revolution . . . [t]he primacy of our state’s constitution, so long
neglected, [became] accepted by all.”2
Twenty-one years after Justice Gillette made that observation,
however, the revolution has still yet to reach one of the most
important sections of the Oregon Bill of Rights:  the first clause
of article I, section 5, which provides that “[n]o money shall be
drawn from the Treasury for the benefit of any religeous [sic], or
theological institution.”3
On December 16, 1976, eighteen days before Justice Linde
joined the Oregon Supreme Court, the court issued its decision
in Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. City of Eugene .4  In Eugene
Sand & Gravel , the court held, without analysis and without ex-
planation, that the three-part test adopted by the U.S. Supreme
* Partner, Stoel Rives L.L.P., Portland, Oregon, and an ordained minister in the
United Church of Christ.  He is a graduate of Stanford University, Union Theologi-
cal Seminary, and Yale Law School.  He has represented litigants in several
landmark Oregon constitutional cases.  He has served on the national board of di-
rectors of the American Civil Liberties Union, and is a former president of the
ACLU of Oregon.
1 See  State v. Kennedy, 295 Or. 260, 262, 666 P.2d 1316, 1318 (1983) (citing eight
cases, all decided in 1982 or 1983, illustrating “the rule . . . that all questions of state
law be considered and disposed of” before reaching a federal constitutional claim).
2 State v. Owens, 302 Or. 196, 208, 729 P.2d 524, 531 (1986) (Gillette, J.,
concurring).
3 OR. CONST. art. I, § 5.
4 276 Or. 1007, 558 P.2d 338 (1976), cert. denied , 434 U.S. 876 (1977).
[541]
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-2\ORE205.txt unknown Seq: 2  9-MAR-07 8:52
542 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85, 541
Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman5 for use in evaluating claims under
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment is the “appro-
priate” test to apply “in determining whether a law is constitu-
tional” under article I, sections 2, 3, and 5 of the Oregon
Constitution.6
Even in the context of state constitutional jurisprudence as it
stood in 1976, the opinion in Eugene Sand & Gravel  was curious.
Long before the state constitutional revolution of the 1980s, the
court had construed article I, section 5 independently of its fed-
eral analogue.  In Dickman v. School District No. 62C ,7 the court
considered a challenge to a state statute that authorized public
school districts to provide textbooks without charge to pupils in
parochial schools.  The court held that the statute violated article
I, section 5, and that it was “unnecessary, therefore, to consider
plaintiffs’ contention that the statute violates also the First or
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.”8
In response to the dissenting justice’s assertion that the court
should “apply,” “embrace[ ],” and “adhere to” a U.S. Supreme
Court decision construing the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment,9 the court in Dickman  stressed that it had a “duty”
to decide the state constitutional issue without being bound by
federal court decisions:
A decision of the Supreme Court of the United States holding
that certain legislation is not in violation of the federal consti-
tution is not an adjudication of the constitutionality of the leg-
islation under a state constitution.  In such a case, it is not only
within the power of the state courts, it is their duty  to decide
whether the state constitution has been violated.  Our views
on the policy or interpretation of a particular constitutional
provision do not always coincide with those of the Supreme
Court of the United States.10
5 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).  The Lemon  test has been criticized by several U.S.
Supreme Court Justices. See McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722,
2750-51 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing cases).  However, it has never been
overruled; indeed, the “secular purpose” prong of the test was the tool used by the
majority in McCreary  to conclude that certain Ten Commandments displays on pub-
lic property violate the Establishment Clause. Id.  at 2732-37 (majority opinion) (an-
alyzing and applying the “purpose” prong); id.  at 2745 (affirming injunction against
Ten Commandments display because of its “predominantly religious purpose”).
6 Eugene Sand & Gravel , 276 Or. at 1012-13, 558 P.2d at 342.
7 232 Or. 238, 366 P.2d 533 (1961), cert. denied , 371 U.S. 823 (1962).
8 Id.  at 246, 366 P.2d at 537.
9 Id.  at 261, 266, 366 P.2d at 545, 547 (Rossman, J., dissenting).
10 Id.  at 260-61, 366 P.2d at 545 (majority opinion) (stating that the trial court was
not bound by Everson v. Board of Education , 330 U.S. 1 (1947)) (emphasis added).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-2\ORE205.txt unknown Seq: 3  9-MAR-07 8:52
2006] A Remnant of Prerevolutionary Oregon Constitutional Law 543
Despite the Dickman court’s declaration of independence with
respect to state constitutional adjudication, and despite the fact
that Dickman  construed the same section of the Oregon Consti-
tution that was at issue in Eugene Sand & Gravel , the court in
Eugene Sand & Gravel  did not even cite Dickman , let alone ex-
plain why it was rejecting the Dickman  holding that the court
had a “duty” to construe the state constitution according to its
own terms.
Twenty-one years after Justice Gillette stated that the Oregon
constitutional revolution had been “accomplished,” the anomaly
of the Eugene Sand & Gravel opinion is even more glaring.  As
part of that revolution, the Oregon Supreme Court developed a
methodology for deciding the meaning of the 1857 Constitution.
In Priest v. Pearce , the court stated that in determining the mean-
ing of a constitutional provision, it would examine “[i]ts specific
wording, the case law surrounding it, and the historical circum-
stances that led to its creation.”11  Moreover, in construing a pro-
vision of the 1857 Constitution, a court’s “focus must be on the
intent of the enactors of the provision at issue,”12 with the goal of
“understand[ing] the wording [of the provision] in the light of the
way that wording would have been understood and used by those
who created the provision.”13
None of those elements of Oregon constitutional jurispru-
dence was present in the Eugene Sand & Gravel  opinion.  If a
student in any state constitutional law class in an Oregon law
school were asked on an exam to describe the methodology that
Oregon courts use in interpreting article I, section 5, and if the
student were to answer that question by saying, “The Oregon Su-
preme Court would borrow a test developed by the U.S. Su-
preme Court for interpreting the Establishment Clause of the
First Amendment, rather than inquiring into the specific wording
of article I, section 5, or into the intent of its framers,” that stu-
dent would receive an “F” on the exam.  Yet that is exactly what
the court itself did in Eugene Sand & Gravel .
On at least one occasion, the Oregon Supreme Court has de-
11 Priest v. Pearce, 314 Or. 411, 415-16, 840 P.2d 65, 67 (1992).  The court has
frequently applied the Priest v. Pearce  methodology in subsequent cases, and it has
twice said that it “must” do so.  Armatta v. Kitzhaber, 327 Or. 250, 256, 959 P.2d 49,
53 (1998); Neher v. Chartier, 319 Or. 417, 422, 879 P.2d 156, 158 (1994).
12 Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 331 Or. 38, 57 n.12, 11 P.3d 228, 239 n.12 (2000).
13 Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or. 83, 90-91, 23 P.3d 333, 338 (2001)
(quoting Vannatta v. Keisling, 324 Or. 514, 530, 931 P.2d 770, 781 (1997)).
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clined the opportunity to revisit the Eugene Sand & Gravel  hold-
ing.  In Powell v. Bunn ,14 the court of appeals held that it was
bound by Eugene Sand & Gravel  to apply the Lemon  test in a
case challenging governmental action as a violation of article I,
section 5, noting that the Supreme Court has never overruled
Eugene Sand & Gravel  and “the fact that the Supreme Court is
free to revisit its own precedents . . . does not mean that we may
do so.”15  The plaintiffs petitioned the Oregon Supreme Court to
review the court of appeals decision in Powell , but the court de-
nied the petition, over the objection of Justices Durham and
Balmer.16 Eugene Sand & Gravel  thus remains on the books as
an anachronistic vestige of prerevolutionary state constitutional
jurisprudence in Oregon.
If and when the court does take the opportunity to reexamine
Eugene Sand & Gravel , there is no doubt that it will repudiate its
application of the Lemon  test to article I, section 5.  In 1985, the
court specifically abandoned deference to the U.S. Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment when analyzing the analogous sections of Oregon’s
Bill of Rights, article I, sections 2 and 3.  In Salem College &
Academy, Inc. v. Employment Division ,17 the court rejected the
contention that subjecting a private religious school to the Un-
employment Compensation Act would violate the school’s rights
under the First Amendment and under article I, sections 2 and 3.
In doing so, the court criticized the court of appeals for failing to
address the state constitutional issue separately:
The Court of Appeals held that the statutory distinction be-
tween church-supported and independent religious schools
constitutes an establishment of religion forbidden by the First
Amendment, and it stated that “[i]n view of our conclusion
with respect to the federal Constitution, we need not, and do
not, consider the Oregon Constitution.” That approach de-
parted from the judicial responsibility to determine the state’s
own law before deciding whether the state falls short of federal
constitutional standards .18
14 185 Or. App. 334, 59 P.3d 559 (2002), review denied , 336 Or. 60, 77 P.3d 635
(2003) (table).
15 Id.  at 357, 59 P.3d at 576.
16 336 Or. 60, 77 P.3d 635 (2003) (table).
17 298 Or. 471, 695 P.2d 25 (1985).
18 Id.  at 484, 695 P.2d at 34 (citation omitted) (alteration in original) (emphasis
added).
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A year later, in Cooper v. Eugene School District No. 4J ,19 in-
volving a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute that pro-
hibited public school teachers from wearing religious dress while
teaching, the court once more stressed that questions under the
religion clauses of the Oregon Constitution must be decided in-
dependently of the First Amendment:
This court sometimes has treated [Oregon’s religion clauses]
and the First Amendment’s ban on laws prohibiting the free
exercise of religion as “identical in meaning,” but identity of
“meaning” or even of text does not imply that the state’s laws
will not be tested against the state’s own constitutional guaran-
tees before reaching the federal constraints imposed by the
Fourteenth Amendment, or that verbal formulas developed by
the United States Supreme Court in applying the federal text
also govern application of the state’s comparable clauses. . . .
Judicial formulas or “factors” are not themselves the law but
aids to analysis that a court from time to time may employ,
rephrase, or replace with a better interpretation of their con-
stitutional source.20
The court added that it had already  interpreted the meaning of
the guarantees in article I, sections 2 through 7 of the Oregon
Constitution “independently [of the U.S. Constitution], some-
times with results contrary to those reached by the United States
Supreme Court.”21
In Meltebeke v. Bureau of Labor and Industries ,22 the court
again stressed the differences between the guarantees of religious
freedom in the Oregon Constitution and in the U.S. Constitution:
[Article I, Sections 2 and 3] are obviously worded more
broadly than the federal First Amendment, and are remarka-
ble in the inclusiveness and adamancy with which rights of
conscience are to be protected from governmental interfer-
ence.  From our current vantage point of a society that is relig-
iously diverse and relatively  unconcerned about that diversity,
it is difficult to fully appreciate why Oregon’s pioneers ap-
proved these broad and adamant protections.  However, the
history of religious intolerance was fresh in the minds of those
who settled Oregon, many of whom themselves represented
relatively diverse religious beliefs.23
In none of these cases was Eugene Sand & Gravel  even men-
19 301 Or. 358, 723 P.2d 298 (1986).
20 Id.  at 369-70, 723 P.2d at 306-07 (citation and footnote omitted).
21 Id.  at 370-71, 723 P.2d at 307 (citing, inter alia , Salem College  and Dickman) .
22 322 Or. 132, 903 P.2d 351 (1995).
23 Id.  at 146, 903 P.2d at 359.
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tioned, let alone distinguished; indeed, the Oregon Supreme
Court has never cited Eugene Sand & Gravel  in any opinion
since it was decided in 1976.  There is good reason for that omis-
sion, for the kind of analysis of the first clause of article I, section
5 that is required by Priest v. Pearce24  leads to a conclusion re-
garding the meaning and application of that clause very different
from the court’s conclusion in Eugene Sand & Gravel .  As noted
above, Priest v. Pearce  requires analysis of the “specific wording”
of a constitutional provision, “the case law surrounding it, and
the historical circumstances that led to its creation.”25
Specific Wording. The first seventeen words of article I, sec-
tion 5 are simple and straightforward:  “[n]o money shall be
drawn from the Treasury for the benefit of any religeous [sic], or
theological institution.”26  And they are unusually clear.  “No
money” means “no money”—not a penny, not a sou.  “Drawn
from the Treasury” refers to the expenditure of public funds—
that is, money paid to governmental taxing authorities by taxpay-
ers.  “Benefit,” when used as a noun, was defined in the leading
American dictionary at the time of Oregon’s constitutional con-
vention to mean “[a]n act of kindness; a favor conferred” or
“[a]dvantage; profit; a word of extensive use, and expressing
whatever contributes to promote prosperity and personal happi-
ness, or adds value to property.”27
As for “religeous” and “theological,” both the dictionary and
the wording of the Oregon Constitution itself indicate that those
terms were understood broadly in 1857.  “Religion,” according to
the 1854 dictionary, “comprehends the belief and worship of pa-
gans and Mohammedans, as well as of Christians.”28  That broad
understanding of “religion” is reflected in article I, sections 2 and
3, which acknowledge a “Natural right” on the part of humans,
prior to and independent of any social structure, to worship God
“according to the dictates of their own consciences,” and which
bar government from interfering in any way with “the free exer-
cise, and enjoyment of religeous [sic] opinions” or “with the
rights of conscience.”29
24 314 Or. 411, 840 P.2d 65 (1992). See supra  text accompanying note 11.
25 Id. at 415-16, 840 P.2d at 67.
26 OR. CONST. art I, § 5.
27 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
115 (Chauncey A. Goodrich ed., George and Charles Merriam 1854).
28 Id.  at 933.
29 See OR. CONST. art I, §§ 2-3.
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That leaves the word “institution.”  The 1854 dictionary con-
tained these relevant definitions of the word:
2. Establishment; that which is appointed, prescribed, or
founded by authority, and intended to be permanent.  Thus we
speak of the institutions of Moses or Lycurgus.  We apply the
word institution  to laws, rites, and ceremonies, which are en-
joined by authority as permanent rules of conduct or of
government.
3. An organized society, established either by law or by the
authority of individuals, for promoting any object, public or
social. . . .
4. A system of the elements or rules of any art or science.30
Thus, at the time of the creation of article I, section 5 in 1857, the
word “institution” was understood to have a very broad meaning,
including both organizations and belief systems.
Case Law. Apart from Eugene Sand & Gravel , only two deci-
sions of the Oregon Supreme Court contain any significant dis-
cussion of article I, section 5.  One of those decisions is Dickman ,
in which the court held that article I, section 5 prohibits the State
from providing free textbooks to students in a Roman Catholic
school.31  The other is Lowe v. City of Eugene ,32 an earlier chap-
ter in the battle over the cross on Skinner’s Butte that led ulti-
mately to Eugene Sand & Gravel .33
The plaintiffs in Lowe  challenged the maintenance, at taxpayer
expense, of a fifty-one-feet-high lighted concrete cross in a city
park, asserting that governmental support of the cross consti-
tuted both an “establishment of religion” in violation of the First
Amendment and an expenditure of “money from the Treasury
for the benefit of a religious institution” in violation of article I,
section 5.34  In its first opinion in the case, the Oregon Supreme
Court held, on a four-to-three vote, that the City’s action in
maintaining the cross did not violate the First Amendment or ar-
ticle I, section 5.  However, the majority did not question the as-
sumption that was a necessary predicate for the plaintiffs’
challenge:  namely, that the expenditure of municipal funds to
30 WEBSTER, supra  note 27, at 612.
31 Dickman v. Sch. Dist. No. 62C, 232 Or. 238, 366 P.2d 533 (1961), cert. denied ,
371 U.S. 823 (1962).
32 Lowe v. City of Eugene (Lowe I), 254 Or. 518, 451 P.2d 117 (1969).
33 There was one more chapter after Eugene Sand & Gravel .  In Separation of
Church and State Committee v. City of Eugene , 93 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 1996), the court
held that the City’s ownership and display of the cross in a public park violated the
Establishment Clause. Id. at 620.
34 See Lowe I , 254 Or. at 520-21, 451 P.2d at 118-19.
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pay for the maintenance of the cross was an expenditure for the
benefit of a religious “institution.”  Rather, the majority con-
cluded that this particular cross was not “religious.”  The major-
ity stated that “[t]he evidence indicates that to many people the
cross . . . carries connotations that are not essentially religious in
character and to such people it has primarily secular mean-
ings,”35 and held that maintenance of the cross was not “a relig-
ious activity.”36
The three dissenting justices used similar terminology, refer-
ring to the “display of the lighted cross” as “a religious activity”
and “a popular religious display.”37  On rehearing, the original
dissenting opinion was adopted as the opinion of the court.38  On
second rehearing, the court made it clear that its decision was
“grounded . . . in part upon state as well as federal constitutional
concepts.”39  The court held that this particular cross was “a testi-
monial to a religious faith,”40 that the expenditure of public
funds to maintain it constituted “the use of public funds to sup-
port [a] preferred religious institution,”41 and that “the enlist-
ment of the hand of government to erect the religious emblem
. . . offends the [state and federal] constitutions.”42  Further, the
court noted that proponents of the cross contended that article I,
section 5, “in limiting its expression to a proscription against
spending public ‘money’ on religious institutions, by implication
approved of turning over public land to them,” and the court
squarely rejected that contention as a “mechanistic interpretation
of the state constitution.”43
Thus, the court in Lowe  recognized that the word “institution”
in article I, section 5 must be given a broad meaning, in keeping
with the intent of the framers “not . . . to permit the state to
sponsor any particular religion.”44 Lowe  stands for the proposi-
35 Id.  at 528, 451 P.2d at 122.
36 Id.  at 529, 451 P.2d at 122.
37 Id.  at 532-33, 451 P.2d at 124 (Goodwin, J., dissenting).
38 Lowe v. City of Eugene (Lowe II), 254 Or. 534, 539, 459 P.2d 222, 224 (1969),
cert. denied sub nom. Eugene Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Lowe, 397 U.S. 1042 (1970)
(rehearing of Lowe I).
39 Lowe v. City of Eugene, 254 Or. 539, 548, 463 P.2d 360, 364 (1969) (denying
rehearing of Lowe II).
40 Id.  at 546, 463 P.2d at 363.
41 Id.  at 547, 463 P.2d at 364.
42 Id.  at 548, 463 P.2d at 364.
43 Id.  at 547-48, 463 P.2d at 364.
44 Id.  at 548, 463 P.2d at 364.
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tion that taxpayer support of the symbol of a particular religion
constitutes “benefit” to a religious “institution,” within the
meaning of article I, section 5.
Historical Circumstances. Although the Oregon Supreme
Court in Eugene Sand & Gravel  held that it was “appropriate” to
use a test borrowed from U.S. Supreme Court cases for interpret-
ing the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, the court
made no inquiry into the historical circumstances out of which
article I, section 5 arose in 1857, and the court made no effort to
compare those circumstances with the circumstances that pre-
vailed sixty-six years earlier, in 1791, when the First Amendment
was adopted.  Both the religious landscape and the constitutional
landscape of the nation had changed considerably in those sixty-
six years.
The last quarter of the eighteenth century was a period of rela-
tive religious calm in America; “the rationalism and Deism of the
Age of Reason” had left their mark in American religious life,
and many people had become
indifferent or even hostile to religion.  Despite the growth of
churches through immigration, a situation in which a steadily
increasing segment of the population had no religious connec-
tions was spreading. . . .
. . . .
. . . [C]hurch life was at a low ebb during the Revolutionary
period, and at the opening of the [nineteenth] century less
than ten [percent] of the population were church
members. . . .45
The situation soon changed.  Beginning at the end of the eight-
eenth century, religious interest reawakened across the coun-
try.46  “The first three decades of the nineteenth century were a
time of intense religious fervor in America.  The Second Great
Awakening . . . swept across the land.  Camp meetings, revivals,
[and] sectarian controversies . . . were all part of the religious
commitment.”47  Revivalist fervor was so intense in upstate New
York that it became known as the “burned-over” district,48 and
out of that district “a vast swarm of Yankee ‘isms’ descended on
45 WILLISTON WALKER, A HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH 436, 507 (Cyril
C. Richardson et al. eds., rev. ed. 1959).
46 Id.
47 Stephen Dow Beckham, Oregon History , in OREGON BLUE BOOK 2005–2006,
at 324, 333 (Sec’y of State ed., 2005).
48 WALKER, supra  note 45, at 516.
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the West like a flight of grasshoppers.”49  The result in Oregon
was a period of “ethnic-religious bitterness in the Oregon Coun-
try,”50 marked by conflicts between Jason Lee, the first Method-
ist missionary in the Oregon Territory, and John McLoughlin, the
Chief Factor of the Hudson’s Bay Company, which “[left] a last-
ing impression on politics and society, contributing to strains of
anti-Catholicism as well as anti-(Protestant)-clericalism, magnify-
ing ideological distinctions, and affecting the development of the
local political culture long after the demise of its American–
Protestant and English–Catholic antagonists.”51
The delegates to the constitutional convention of 1857 were
well aware of the diversity of religious belief that existed in the
Oregon Country, and of the political divisiveness that had ac-
companied it.  During the first week of the convention, delegate
Hector Campbell told the delegates that “[t]he clergy have been
very severely and perhaps justly censured by the public journals
for the course which they have pursued in reference to political
affairs, and engaging in political strife.”52  Later, in the debates
over the wording of the religion clauses, Matthew Deady, presi-
dent of the convention, noted that this country “contains persons
of all religious denominations as well as nonbelievers,”53 while
Frederick Waymire stated, “The people of this country were
composed of every shade of opinion upon the subject of religion,
from the half-crazy religious fanatic to the unbelieving atheist.”54
This was the setting in which the delegates to Oregon’s consti-
tutional convention assembled in Salem in August 1857.  The de-
bates during the convention demonstrate that a majority of
delegates favored strong constitutional protections for this diver-
sity of belief, and an equally strong constitutional separation of
49 SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
518 (1965).
50 DAVID ALAN JOHNSON, FOUNDING THE FAR WEST:  CALIFORNIA, OREGON,
AND NEVADA, 1840–1890, at 49 (1992).
51 Id.  at 50.
52 THE OREGON CONSTITUTION AND PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE CON-
STITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1857, at 113 (Charles Henry Carey ed., 1926) [herein-
after THE OREGON CONSTITUTION AND PROCEEDINGS].  The transactions of the
constitutional convention are listed in the official Journal of the Proceedings , and
also printed in the Weekly Oregonian  and Oregon Statesman . Id.  at 57.  While this
Article traces the constitutional debates chronologically, the citations to the conven-
tion alternate between the various sources to provide a full picture of the events that
transpired.
53 Id.  at 300.
54 Id.  at 301.
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religion and government.  During the first week of the conven-
tion, for example, Campbell urged the convention to consider
employing a chaplain; after making the comment quoted above
concerning the criticism that had been leveled at some clergy for
their political involvement, he argued:
But, sir, it seems to me that here is a place, and this is an occa-
sion where [clergy] may exercise the functions of their office
without giving offense, and in a proper manner to the accept-
ance of all.  It may be urged by some as a reason why the reso-
lution should not be adopted—the danger of a union of church
and state.  But, sir, from present indications, I think there is no
danger here or in the United States of that union being
formed.55
The convention, however, apparently felt otherwise, and re-
jected the Campbell resolution by a vote of thirty-four to
nineteen.56
That vote was consistent with the views expressed earlier in
that same week during the debate over the proposal to include a
separate bill of rights in the constitution.  From the first day of
that debate, it was clear that a majority of the delegates believed
that a state constitution in 1857 had to be more specific in its
guarantees of religious liberty than earlier state constitutions had
been.  On August 18, 1857, when Delazon Smith moved to estab-
lish “a committee on a bill of rights,” George Williams opposed
it, saying that he “thought such committee unnecessary.  A bill of
rights was sort of a Fourth of July oration in a constitution. . . .”57
Smith responded the next day, saying that “of all the constitu-
tions of all the states,”
[Smith was] best pleased, as a whole, with that of the state of
Indiana. . . . Its bill of rights I should hardly be disposed to
dispense with.  I should like their constitution much less if the
bill of rights was stricken from it.  It is gold refined; it is up
with the progress of the age. Many changes have taken place
since our fathers first formed constitutions .58
One of those changes, Smith noted, was that in earlier days, a
man who did not profess a recognized religion “was not to [be]
believed upon oath.”59  He continued:
55 Id.  at 113.
56 Id.
57 Id.  at 79.
58 Id.  at 101 (emphasis added).
59 Id.  at 102 (alteration in original).
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And I remember a great many other things which people held
entirely republican and right, which subsequent experience
and the progress of the age taught us are blots upon our na-
tional escutcheon.  And this preamble to the constitution of
Indiana recognizes this progress, and thus recognizing embod-
ies them in her bill of rights.  She nobly reasserts what our
fathers said about the natural rights of man to the pursuit of
life, liberty and happiness, but she proceeds to assert the civil
rights of the citizens as ascertained in those 70 years of
progress.60
Erasmus Shattuck spoke in favor of Smith’s motion, saying:
[T]he history of the world teaches us that the majority may
become fractious in their spirit and trample upon the rights of
the minority. . . . Then, if the individual citizen is to be pro-
tected in this point in which he is endangered, there must be
restrictions put into this constitution. . . . For these reasons,
then, I am in favor of all the essential principles of a bill of
rights.61
The convention then approved Smith’s motion for the appoint-
ment of a committee on the bill of rights.62  Its members were
appointed, along with the members of the convention’s other
standing committees, on August 20, 1857.63  La Fayette Grover
was named chairman.64  The committee submitted its report just
two days later.  It proposed a bill of rights closely patterned after
the bill of rights in the Indiana Constitution of 1851,65 but that
“differed most from the Indiana model in its treatment of organ-
ized religion and immigrant rights.”66  The committee’s determi-
nation to erect a stronger barrier between government and
religion than had marked the Indiana Constitution was evident in
the words they chose to begin the preamble.  Professor Johnson
describes the differences:
[T]he preamble to the Indiana Bill of Rights stated:  “We, the
people of the State of Indiana, grateful to Almighty God for
the free exercise of the right to choose our own form of gov-
ernment, do ordain this Constitution.”  In contrast, the report
of Grover’s committee pointedly removed all references to
Godly ordination; it held instead that “we, the people of the
state of Oregon, to the end that justice be established, order
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.  at 104.
63 Id.  at 106.
64 Id.  at 29.
65 Id.  at 468 (charting the sources of the Oregon Constitution).
66 JOHNSON, supra  note 50, at 178.
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maintained, and liberty be perpetuated, do ordain this
constitution. . . .”67
The committee modified the first section of article I in a simi-
lar fashion.  Eighteen of the first thirty sections of article I were
copied verbatim from the Indiana Constitution of 1851,68 but sec-
tion 1 was one of the sections that the committee changed.  Arti-
cle I, section 1 of the Indiana Constitution began with the
declaration “[t]hat all people are created equal; [and] that they
are endowed by their CREATOR with certain inalienable
rights.”69  The Oregon framers deleted the reference to the Crea-
tor, and made it clear that their conception of equality was a
purely secular one, tied to the concept of a social compact among
free men.  In contrast to the language of the Indiana Constitu-
tion, article I, section 1 of the Oregon Constitution declares “that
all men, when they form a social compact are equal in right.”70
That change in wording appears to be an intentional reflection of
the idea advanced by Rousseau a century earlier, that humanity’s
best hope for freedom from tyranny lies in the willingness of
humans to form a social compact with one another and to aban-
don their claims of natural right.71
That same secularizing impulse was evident in the debates over
the original section 6, which ultimately became section 5 of arti-
cle I in the final document.  The August 22, 1857, report from
Grover’s committee on the bill of rights proposed the following
wording for section 6:  “No money shall be drawn from the trea-
sury for the compensation of any religious services, or for the
benefit of any theological institution.”72
On September 8, 1857, the convention convened as a commit-
tee of the whole for the purpose of discussing the bill of rights.73
When it came time to consider section 6, Campbell “moved to
strike out that portion forbidding the drawing of money from the
treasury for the compensation of religious services.”74  The basis
of his opposition appeared to be the fact that the proposal would
67 Id.
68 THE OREGON CONSTITUTION AND PROCEEDINGS, supra  note 52, app. a at 468.
69 IND. CONST. of 1851 art. I, § 1.
70 OR. CONST. art. I, § 1.
71 See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (London, G.G.J. & J.
Robinson 1791) (1762).
72 THE OREGON CONSTITUTION AND PROCEEDINGS, supra note 52, at 119.
73 Id.  at 296, 301.
74 Id.  at 301.
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“prevent the employment of a chaplain by the legislature.”75  He
complained that the proposal was an “innovation” that was “un-
precedented” in any of the other existing state constitutions, and
that it was “a disregard of the injunctions of the New
Testament.”76
Frederick Waymire, who had previously stated that he thought
“the Indiana bill of rights would honor any constitution,”77 now
spoke in opposition to Campbell’s motion to strike:
The people of this country were composed of every shade of
opinion upon the subject of religion, from the half-crazy relig-
ious fanatic to the unbelieving atheist.  And we had no right to
compel by law the support of any from the pockets of all; that
was what this would do.
Some ministers of the leading denominations would be se-
lected as chaplains, and to perform other religious services,
and all the smaller denominations, and all who professed no
religion, and all who believed in none, would be taxed to pay
them.  Was this right?  Manifestly it was not.  It was a compul-
sory support of the church—at war with our institutions, and
at war with civil and religious liberty.  If legislators wished
prayers he had no objection to their having them.  But he did
object to compelling any man against his will paying for
them.78
Thomas Dryer then spoke in favor of Campbell’s motion:
He believed that money should be drawn from the treasury to
pay for religious services just as readily and as liberally as to
pay for other services.  He was opposed to this constitution
starting out in the world carrying upon its face features that
are not attached to any other constitution in the United
States.79
A prohibition on paying chaplains, Dryer said, “was infidelity,
and nothing else,”80 and if the constitution with this “extraordi-
nary provision” were presented to the people, it “is sure to be
defeated, and deservedly so.”81
W.H. Watkins agreed with Dryer; he said the provision was
“intended as a slur, not at any particular denomination, but at
75 Id.  at 296.
76 Id.  at 297.
77 Id.  at 105.
78 Id.  at 301-02.
79 Id.  at 298.
80 Id.  at 305.
81 Id.  at 298-99.
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religion itself.”82
La Fayette Grover spoke against the Campbell motion.  He
noted, “Religious as well as civil liberty has been of progressive
growth in our country since the time of the revolution.”83  He
quoted a portion of the Massachusetts Constitution that required
the expenditure of public funds “for the institution of the public
worship of God, and for the support and maintenance of public,
Protestant teachers of piety, religion and morality.”84  Grover
objected to that clause, because
to say that . . . religion should be established and sustained by
the government is to go back two centuries in the world’s his-
tory.  Under this clause great civil abuses and much tyranny
grew up in Massachusetts.  Laws were passed requiring that a
certain portion of a man’s annual income should be devoted to
the support of a particular church called the “standing order,”
to the exclusions of all others.  Citizens were compelled, under
penalties, to attend once a quarter upon that church; a
“Church of England” was the favorite of the state.85
Grover noted that when Maine separated from Massachusetts
and entered the Union in 1820, it rejected that clause in its new
constitution, and that even the people of Massachusetts “since
1820 have gradually disregarded it themselves.”86  He then com-
mented on the developments in constitutional protections for re-
ligious liberty that had taken place since the first state
constitutions and the First Amendment had been adopted:
The late constitutions of the western states have, step by step,
tended to a more distinct separation of church and state, until
the great state of Indiana, whose new constitution has been
most recently framed, embraced very nearly the principle con-
tained in this section, as reported, now under consideration.
It is true this constitution goes a step farther than other con-
stitutions on this subject; but if that step is in the right direc-
tion, and consistent with the proper development of our
institutions, I see no weight in the objection that it is new. Let
us take the step farther, and declare a complete divorce of
church and state.87
In response to a contention by another delegate that attempts
to eliminate religion from the public sphere during the French
82 Id.  at 299.
83 Id.  at 302.
84 Id.
85 Id.  (quoting MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. III, cl. 1 (1780)).
86 Id.
87 Id.  at 302-03 (emphasis added).
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Revolution had led to “calamities” in that country, Grover ar-
gued that “for centuries previously the public mind [in France]
had become demoralized by a union of church and state, promul-
gation and enforcing forms rather than faith, conventionalisms
rather than true morality.”88  Grover hoped for something differ-
ent in Oregon:  “Our government is based upon absolute free-
dom of conscience, guaranteeing full toleration and protection of
religious faith, but at the same time withholding state patronage
and political place from the churches.”89
William Farrar then spoke in favor of the Campbell motion,
stating that the convention’s earlier decision not to employ a
chaplain for its own sessions “has aroused in the minds of not a
few individuals in this territory a deep-seated feeling of prejudice
against any constitution that this convention may send forth to
the people for their adoption.”90  Turning to Campbell’s present
motion, Farrar criticized Grover’s comments in opposition to it
as “entirely inopportune.  It is not, sir, a question whether we
shall unite church and state, as he (Mr. Grover) declared.  It has
no relevancy to any such proposition—it does not point in that
direction.”91  He warned that if the Campbell amendment were
not adopted, “nine-tenths of the professing Christians in Oregon
. . . will denounce your constitution because the action of this
convention has cast indirectly a slur upon their religious faith and
practices, or upon their creed.”92
Matthew Deady, president of the convention, opposed Camp-
bell’s motion, and disagreed with Farrar’s comments about public
opinion.  Deady said that there were “persons in this commu-
nity” who would oppose the constitution if it barred payment for
religious services, but that it was “equally true” that there were
others who would oppose it if it did not  contain such a prohibi-
tion.  He added:
But I am not here to adapt myself altogether to the opinions
of either of these classes.  I am here to determine upon correct
principles what is right and what is wrong.  I have great respect
for [Mr.Campbell]. . . . With him, I believe that morality and
private virtue and a proper sense of dependence upon an over-
ruling Providence are the true foundation of a nation’s great-
88 Id.  at 303.
89 Id.
90 Id.  at 299.
91 Id.
92 Id.  at 299-300.
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ness.  But, sir, what is the theory of our government upon this
subject?  It is that the government shall be separated from
churches, and the maintenance and administration of religion;
that religious duties shall be no function of the government.93
Stephen Chadwick agreed with Deady; he favored the original
committee report, stating, “He would have no connection of
church and state.”94  He had been “taught to reverence prayer,
and religious services,” he said, but “he was also educated in the
doctrine of the divorce of church and state.”95
Reuben Boise stated that the original committee proposal
went too far in prohibiting payment for all religious services, be-
cause “[i]t was the custom of all governments to employ chap-
lains in their penitentiaries and asylums; reformation was
declared to be one object of punishment.  The employment of
chaplains was one mode of reformation.”96  George Williams
agreed that the original proposal “went too far,” but he was op-
posed to the payment of chaplains in the legislature, so he moved
to modify the Campbell proposal by prohibiting “the drawing of
money from the treasury for compensation of religious services
in either branch of the legislature.”97  He asserted that “[a] man
in this country had a right to be a Methodist, Baptist, Roman
Catholic, or what else he chose, but no government had the
moral right to tax all of these creeds and classes to inculcate di-
rectly or indirectly the tenets of any one of them.”98  “[T]he peo-
ple,” he said, “should not be taxed to give preference to one
creed over another.”99
The committee of the whole rejected Williams’s compromise
proposal, and adopted the Campbell amendment by a vote of
twenty-four to sixteen, so that at the end of the day on Septem-
ber 8, 1857, section 6 read as follows:  “No money shall be drawn
from the state treasury for the benefit of any religious or theolog-
ical institution.”100
But that was not the end of the debate.  On September 11, the
convention, still meeting as a committee of the whole, approved
93 Id.  at 300.






100 Id.  at 301, 306.
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the amended version of section 6 (although the Journal of the
Proceedings  states that the last word in the section was “institu-
tions” rather than “institution”101), but Williams then renewed
his motion to add the following language to the section:  “Nor
shall any money be appropriated for the payment of any religious
services, in either house of the legislative assembly.”102
This time, the amendment was approved, on a vote of twenty-
six to twenty-one.103  The delegates who had expressed the
strongest sentiments in favor of strict separation of church and
state (Chadwick, Deady, Grover, and Waymire) voted yes, and
those who favored a more accommodating stance (Campbell,
Farrar, and Logan) voted no.104
On September 12, the report of the committee of the whole
came before the convention for final approval.  Campbell “ad-
dressed the convention against the adoption of the anti-chaplain
section,” and David Logan “moved to recommit the bill with in-
structions to strike out” that section, but the motion to recommit
failed, and the convention adopted the section as it was reported
from the committee of the whole.105  The vote was twenty-five to
ten, with the strict separationist delegates (Chadwick, Deady,
Grover, and Waymire) voting yes, and the accommodationist del-
egates (Campbell, Farrar, and Logan) voting no,106 just as they
had done on September 11.
The content of the debate on the original proposal for section
6, and the votes on the various proposals to modify that section
that led to the present wording of article I, section 5, show that
the strict separationists prevailed at the 1857 convention.  Thus,
Hector Campbell, who had asserted at the beginning of the con-
vention that there was “no danger” of a “union of church and
state” in Oregon,107 lost on his proposal to employ a chaplain for
the convention, and he lost in his proposal to eliminate all
prohibitions on the payment for religious services.  Further,
Dryer did not want the constitution to include provisions hostile
to religion “that are not attached to any other constitution in the
101 Id.  at 327.
102 Id.
103 Id.  at 327-28.
104 Id.
105 Id.  at 343.
106 Id.  at 342.
107 Id.  at 113.
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United States,”108 Watkins viewed the prohibition on taxpayer-
supported religious services “as a slur . . . at religion itself,”109
and Farrar agreed with Watkins that the provision would be re-
garded as “a slur upon . . . religious faith and practices.”110  These
delegates were on the losing end of the debate, and they all voted
against the bill of rights because of it.
In contrast, Grover wanted the constitution to “declare a com-
plete divorce of church and state,”111 Deady believed that “the
theory of our government” was that “the government shall be
separated from churches, and the maintenance and administra-
tion of religion [and] that religious duties shall be no function of
the government,”112 Chadwick favored “no connection of church
and state,”113 and Waymire believed that government “had no
right to compel by law the support of any [religion] from the
pockets of all [people].”114  These delegates were on the prevail-
ing side of the debate, and they all voted in favor of the bill of
rights because of it.  Although the delegates had rejected the pro-
hibition on “the compensation of any religious services” (proba-
bly because there were enough delegates who agreed with Boise
that paying for chaplains in the prisons would serve the cause of
reformation, which the delegates had declared, in article I, sec-
tion 15, to be the foundational purpose of all of Oregon’s crimi-
nal laws), they had included a prohibition on the payment of
public money for religious services in the legislature.  The major-
ity thus did what Grover had urged them to do:  “to take the step
farther” than any previous constitution had gone in guaranteeing
“a more distinct separation of church and state.”115
This history shows that a majority of the members of the con-
stitutional convention favored a more explicit separation of
church and state than could be found in any other state constitu-
tion of the time.  The “declarations of rights” in the constitutions
of the original thirteen states often did nothing to “separate”
church from state; indeed, some states had “persisted” long after
the Revolution “in imposing restraints upon the free exercise of
108 Id.  at 298.
109 Id.  at 299.
110 Id.  at 299-300.
111 Id.  at 302-03.
112 Id.  at 300.
113 Id.  at 305.
114 Id.  at 301.
115 Id.  at 302-03.
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religion and in discriminating against particular religious
groups.”116  The North Carolina Constitution, for example, “for-
bade officeholders to ‘deny . . . the truth of the Protestant relig-
ion,’” and “Maryland permitted taxation for support of the
Christian religion and limited civil office to Christians until
1818.”117  The Massachusetts Constitution declared that it was
“the duty of all men . . . to worship the SUPREME BEING,”118
and direct public support of religion did not end in that state un-
til 1833.119
The delegates to the Oregon constitutional convention com-
pletely rejected those older patterns of constitutionally author-
ized (and even mandated) public support for religion.  “Many
changes have taken place since our fathers first formed constitu-
tions,” Delazon Smith told the convention,120 and the evangelical
revivals and sectarian strife along the frontier in the first half of
the nineteenth century were part of those changes.  By the time
the delegates gathered in Salem in August 1857, there was a
strong feeling that the people needed more  protection against
the incursion of religious and sectarian bodies into the fabric of
state government than had been the case in 1791.  The delegates
were very much aware of the diversity of religious opinion in Or-
egon, and it was clear that they meant to prevent state govern-
ment from interfering with it.
This history demonstrates that the court in Eugene Sand &
Gravel  erred in adopting the Lemon  test as the “appropriate”
test for determining the meaning of the religion clauses of the
Oregon Constitution.  It may be subject to debate, in any given
case, whether the expenditure of public money in support of a
religious cause violates the First Amendment, for the “primary
effect” of a particular expenditure (to take just one of the three
prongs of the Lemon  test as an example) is often in the eyes of
the beholder.  However, there can be no such debate under arti-
cle I, sections 2, 3, and 5:  those sections “permanently secure[d]
the . . . religious rights of the citizen generally, [and left] the
rights of conscience untouched” (that is, untouched by the hand
of government), as Smith put it on the last day of the conven-
116 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 14 (1947).
117 Id.  at 14 n.17.
118 Colo v. Treasurer & Receiver Gen., 392 N.E.2d 1195, 1196 n.4 (Mass. 1979)
(quoting MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. II).
119 See id.  at 1199 n.10.
120 THE OREGON CONSTITUTION AND PROCEEDINGS, supra  note 52, at 101.
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tion.121  The bill of rights, he said, “leaves religion to achieve its
conquests under the voluntary system”122—that is, without the
“benefit” of governmental support.  Sections 2 and 3 were thus
intended to bar government from interfering in any  way with the
citizens’ rights of conscience, and section 5 was intended to be a
flat prohibition on the expenditure of any  public funds for the
benefit of any religious or theological institution.  “No money”
means “no money,” and by using that language, the authors of
section 5 carried out what La Fayette Grover proposed:  “a com-
plete divorce of church and state.”123
CONCLUSION
In Lowe v. City of Eugene , the Oregon Supreme Court con-
cluded that taxpayer support of the symbol of a particular relig-
ion constitutes a “benefit” to a religious “institution,” within the
meaning of article I, section 5.  That conclusion was correct, for it
would be disingenuous to conclude that the State could appropri-
ate money from the public treasury to erect symbols of particular
religious faiths without violating article I, section 5 simply be-
cause no specific “institution,” in the narrow sense of the word,
was benefited.  Erection of Latin crosses at ten-mile intervals
along Oregon’s highways by the department of transportation
would “benefit” the religious “institution” of Christianity, even
though it would be impossible to trace any particular financial
benefit to any particular church flowing from such state-
sponsored crosses.  Similarly, the legislature would violate article
I, section 5 if it appropriated money to erect a billboard on state
capitol grounds, or anywhere else, containing the unadorned
message “Believe in God,” or indeed the even simpler message,
“Have Faith.”
Article I, section 5 was intended to prohibit the State from
favoring religion over non-religion, and from favoring non-
religion over religion; the State would violate that section if it
spent money to encourage people to “Have Faith” just as it
would if it spent money to encourage people to “Reject Super-
natural Beliefs:  Embrace Rationality.”
In Dickman , the Oregon Supreme Court said that “the wall of
separation in this state must . . . be kept ‘high and impregnable’
121 Id.  at 387.
122 Id . at 387-88.
123 Id.  at 303.
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to meet the demands of Article I, § 5.”124  In Cooper , the court
said:
The religion clauses of Oregon’s Bill of Rights, Article I, sec-
tions 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, are more than a code.  They are specifi-
cations of a larger vision of freedom for a diversity of religious
beliefs and modes of worship and freedom from state-
supported official faiths or modes of worship.  The cumulation
of guarantees, more numerous and more concrete than the
opening clause of the First Amendment, reinforces the signifi-
cance of the separate guarantees.125
The court’s opinion in Eugene Sand & Gravel  stands in stark
contrast to those cases, and to the consistently strict interpreta-
tion of article I, section 5 that has characterized the court’s opin-
ions.  Oregon has seen much less of the sectarian strife that has
marked the history of many other states in the Union; that is one
reason that the Oregon Supreme Court has apparently had only
one opportunity since Eugene Sand & Gravel  to revisit its hold-
ing in that case.126  But when the next opportunity comes along
to review Eugene Sand & Gravel  and the interpretation of sec-
tion 5, the Oregon Supreme Court should take it, and continue
the state constitutional revolution by providing Eugene Sand &
Gravel , as Justice Stevens recently urged with respect to an ear-
lier U.S. Supreme Court decision, “with a decent burial in a
grave adjacent to”127 other discarded vestiges of prerevolution-
ary days.
124 Dickman v. Sch. Dist. No. 62C, 232 Or. 238, 259, 366 P.2d 533, 544 (1961).
125 Cooper v. Eugene Sch. Dist. No. 4J, 301 Or. 358, 371, 723 P.2d 298, 307 (1986).
126 See Powell v. Bunn, 185 Or. App. 334, 59 P.3d 559 (2002), review denied , 336
Or. 60, 77 P.3d 635 (2003) (table).
127 Marshall v. Marshall, 126 S. Ct. 1735, 1752 (2006) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(referring to his desire to see the “probate exception” to federal court jurisdiction
put to rest).
